

# Shared Cryptographic Bits Via Quantized Quadrature Phase Amplitudes of Light

Yi Mu<sup>1,2</sup>, Jennifer Seberry<sup>2</sup>, and Yuliang Zheng<sup>2,3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Department of Computing, University of Western Sydney (Nepean),  
PO Box 10, Kingswood, NSW 2747, Australia*

<sup>2</sup> *Centre for Computer Security Research, Department of Computer Science,  
University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia*

<sup>3</sup> *School of Computing & Information Technology, Monash University,  
McMahons Road, Frankston, VIC 3199, Australia*


## Abstract

We propose a novel quantum cryptographic protocol without using polarized photons. The protocol consists of an optical coupler and four nonorthogonal coherent states which are analyzed by means of quadrature phase amplitudes of quantized light field.

## 1 Introduction

Quantum cryptography is based upon quantum mechanical phenomena such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and quantum correlation. The later is represented by the EPR or Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm *gedankenexperiment* [1, 2]. A well-known protocol was suggested by Bennett, Brassard and co-workers in Refs. [3, 4]. This protocol is now called BB protocol. The BB protocol shows that information can be enclosed in one of four nonorthogonal quantum states (based on photon polarization) on two bases in such a way that any attempt to extract the information by an eavesdropper will randomize and hence destroy the information. In other words, the eavesdropper's acts will definitely cause a change in the signal between the legitimate users, which therefore reveals the presence of the eavesdropper. On the other hand it has been demonstrated that EPR and Bell's theorem or inequality [5] are also useful in quantum cryptography. Protocols based EPR and Bell's theorem exploit the properties of quantum-correlated particles. In particular, as eavesdropping unavoidably introduces some local condition, it causes the data measured by legitimate users to display no violation of Bell's inequality and then reveals the attempt of eavesdropping [6]. A further simplified protocol which does not use Bell's inequality has been proposed by Bennett *et al*[7]. Although there are some other interesting protocols, for instance, by photon interferometry[8], teleporting [9], rejected-data[10], and so on, the BB protocol and Ekert's protocol are the most typical models in quantum cryptography.

In this paper we develop a quantum cryptosystem which allows a cryptographic key bit to be encoded using four *nonorthogonal* quantum states described by non-commuting *quadrature phase amplitudes* of a weak optical field, but not photon polarization! The nonorthogonal states are designed to have a large multi-overlap, hence it is impossible to obtain a certain result when performing a measurement on one of these states. Our system is constructed using an optical coupler as showed in figure 1, where a cryptographic communication is implemented between Alice and Bob. Alice is



**Figure 1** The schematic diagram of the quantum cryptosystem using an optical coupler. Alice's (or sender's) signal generator is labeled by  $G_A$ ; Bob's (or receiver's) is labeled by  $G_B$ .

the sender who has a signal generator which can produce four nonorthogonal states and Bob is the receiver who measures the signal states by means of an optical coupler. One feature of the system is that it allows cryptographic signals to be coupled with Bob's squeezed light [11]. The coupling of light pulses provides us with a significant gain in the signal to noise ratio in comparison with that using a conventional coherent light source. This in turn provides us with a more efficient cryptographic key distribution protocol.

## 2 Physical background

Since our protocol appears to be substantially different from that using polarized photons, we should explain the relationship between uncertainty and quantum measurement.

For a quantum field mode  $c$ , we can write it in the form of  $c = c_1 + ic_2$ , where  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  are quadrature phase amplitudes. The inequality of uncertainty for the quadrature phase amplitudes is given by

$$\langle \Delta c_1^2 \rangle \langle \Delta c_2^2 \rangle \geq 1/16. \quad (1)$$

where  $\langle \Delta c_1^2 \rangle$  ( $\langle \Delta c_2^2 \rangle$ ) denotes the variance of  $c_1$  ( $c_2$ ). Inequality (1) suggests that only one of two quadrature phase amplitudes can be accurately determined for one measurement.

For a squeezed state which is a minimum uncertainty state, the equality of (1) will hold, while the variance of one of the quadrature components is squeezed (to zero for a perfect squeezed state) and the variance of the other quadrature component is enlarged (to infinity for a perfect squeezed state). For convenience, we assume that  $b$  is a squeezing mode. An ideal squeezed state is obtained from a vacuum state  $|0\rangle$  by operation with the squeezing operator

$$S(\xi) = \exp\left(\frac{1}{2}\xi^* b^2 - \frac{1}{2}\xi b^{\dagger 2}\right),$$

followed by operation with the displacement operator

$$D(\beta) = \exp(\beta b^{\dagger} - \beta^* b),$$


i.e.,

$$|\mu\nu\beta\rangle = D(\beta)S(\xi)|0\rangle, \quad (2)$$

where  $\beta$  is the amplitude of mode  $b$ ,  $\xi = r \exp(i\theta)$ ,  $|\mu|^2 = \cosh^2 |r|$ , and  $|\nu|^2 = \sinh^2 |r|$ .  $r$  denotes a squeezing parameter. The variances of quadrature phase amplitudes can be described by

$$\langle \Delta b_1^2 \rangle = \frac{1}{2}e^{-2r}, \quad \langle \Delta b_2^2 \rangle = \frac{1}{2}e^{2r}. \quad (3)$$

As showed in figure 2 (b), two orthogonal squeezed states are used by Bob as his input to the optical coupler. The mode  $b_E = b_1$  corresponds to  $r \gg 0$ , while the mode  $b_N = ib_2$  corresponds to  $r \ll 0$ . One advantage of using squeezed light is that one of quadrature components can be measured with little influence of quantum noise.



**Figure 2** On planes of quadrature-phase amplitudes, (a) shows Alice's encoding strategy based on four nonorthogonal coherent states; (b) shows Bob's tap-fibre modes using squeezed light. Uncertainty of a state is represented by error ellipses for squeezed states and by error circles for coherent states.

The area of ellipse for a mode represents uncertainty (or noise), for instance, we can see that, for the squeezed mode  $b_E = b_1$  the  $x$  component (the projection on  $x$  axis) is knowable (small noise, ideally zero), but the  $y$  component (the projection on  $y$  axis) is uncertain (large noise, ideally infinity). We can explain the other mode similarly.

For a coherent state, since the photon distribution is Poissonian, the uncertainties for both quadrature-phase amplitudes are equal and the equality in (1) also holds. Hence both variances of the quadrature phase amplitudes are  $1/4$ . Accordingly, in figure 2 (a) we can see a noise circle for each coherent state, where we have assumed that mode  $a$  represents a coherent state with four encoding arrangements  $a_E = a_1$ ,  $a_W = -a_1$ ,  $a_N = ia_2$ , and  $a_S = -ia_2$  (east, west, north, and south states). Under our encoding strategy, overlaps among these states should be as large as possible, thus it is accordingly assumed that the overlap between the east and west states is approximately 65%, so does the overlap between the north and south states. This requires that the mean number of photons for each state should be around 0.1. The absolute magnitude of overlap of two coherent states can be calculated by

$$|\langle \alpha | \beta \rangle|^2 = e^{-|\alpha - \beta|^2}. \quad (4)$$

Using this formula, it is easy to find that the overlap between the east and west state or the north and south states is 65%, and between the east and north states is around 82% (the same for each other pairs of neighbour states).

When a state is in an overlap between two states, it will not be able to be determined for sure because it could belong to either of these states. When a state is not in the overlap region, it will be possibly determined without mixing with other states. Since under our arrangement *total* area of overlaps in a state is more than 90% and a large part of area has four overlap layers, it is almost impossible to obtain a certain result when performing a measurement on these states.

A homodyne detection is the most sound scheme for performing a measurement on a quadrature phase amplitude. The value of measurement is actually equal to the projection on the axis of the corresponding detector. We may lock a homodyne detector to an orientation,  $x$ ,  $-x$ ,  $y$ , or  $-y$ , which suits the measurements for different encodings, and consistently, we define four detection vectors  $V_x, V_{-x}, V_y$ , or  $V_{-y}$ , which in fact are four noncommuting projection operators.

We first look at a homodyne detection performed on a *single* coherent state, the east state or the north state, and ignore the superposition for a while. In order to measure the east state, the homodyne detector must be locked at  $x$  direction (i.e., using  $V_x$ ). This is because it has the largest probability of obtaining the correct result – a value of the mean  $\langle a_1 \rangle$ , despite the uncertainty  $\langle \Delta a_1^2 \rangle = 1/4$ . When utilizing the same projection operator  $V_x$  to detect the north state, we will then be unable to obtain a correct value, but have a high probability of obtaining zero (the uncertainty also equals  $1/4$ ). On the other hand, if a state does not have any projection on the detection vector, the state will not be able

to be determined. For example, using  $V_x$ , we cannot determine the west state, since it does not have any useful projection on  $V_x$  (except the projection due to noise). It is concluded that for obtaining a correct detection the detection vector must be set accordingly to the direction of the signal state.

Since we are using four nonorthogonal states and each state has a large area of overlap with other states, it is hardly possible to correctly determine one out of these states by using a homodyne detector. This feature presents a promise for us to apply these states to cryptography.

As shown in figure 1, on the receiving side, we employ an optical coupler which consists of two optical fibres. Alice's signal mode is expressed by a creation operator  $a^\dagger$  or an annihilation operator  $a$ . Bob's mode in the tap fibre is represented by a creation operator  $b^\dagger$  or an annihilation operator  $b$ . For an optical coupler with coupling constant  $\kappa$ , the quantum fields after the coupling obey [12]

$$a' = (1 - \kappa)^{1/2}a + \kappa^{1/2}b, \quad (5)$$

$$b' = -\kappa^{1/2}a + (1 - \kappa)^{1/2}b, \quad (6)$$

where  $0 \leq \kappa \leq 1$ .  $\kappa = 0$  corresponds to no signal having been exchanged between the fibres, while  $\kappa = 1$  corresponds to a complete signal having been exchanged between the fibres. The corresponding field quadrature operators are

$$a_1 = (a + a^\dagger)/2, \quad a_2 = (a - a^\dagger)/2i, \quad (7)$$

$$b_1 = (b + b^\dagger)/2, \quad b_2 = (b - b^\dagger)/2i. \quad (8)$$

The explicit expression for quadrature components for coupled states can be obtained in terms of Equations (5)-(8). After coupling the mean number of photons at port one is given by

$$\langle a'^\dagger a' \rangle = (1 - \kappa)\langle a^\dagger a \rangle + \kappa\langle b^\dagger b \rangle + \sqrt{(1 - \kappa)\kappa}(\langle a^\dagger b \rangle + \langle b^\dagger a \rangle), \quad (9)$$

and at port two is given by

$$\langle b'^\dagger b' \rangle = \kappa\langle a^\dagger a \rangle + (1 - \kappa)\langle b^\dagger b \rangle - \sqrt{(1 - \kappa)\kappa}(\langle a^\dagger b \rangle + \langle b^\dagger a \rangle), \quad (10)$$

### 3 The protocol

The basic intention is to establish a common key between two parties, Alice and Bob, who share no secret information at the beginning of the cryptographic communication. The optical coupler is controlled by Bob who can independently choose his own squeezed input source for it. Both signal generators are controlled by a time base that guarantees a perfect photon coupling. The output signal is detected using two homodyne detectors, one for each port. Also, importantly, in order to realize a perfect coupling, Alice and Bob also need to choose a phase reference before their communication starts. This can be done by Alice sending a sequence of bright reference pulses to Bob and publicly announcing their phase.

Alice's generator produces faint coherent light, on the average, 0.1 photon per pulse, i.e.,  $\langle a^\dagger a \rangle = 0.1$ . As we have mentioned, under this assumption the total overlap on a state is over 90%. The probability a signal pulse contains one or more photon is approximately 10%. This figure suggests that 90% of the total pulses are vacuum. Note that it is possible to employ weaker signal light such that the superposition of the four nonorthogonal states can be even larger, however we do not intend to do that, since our assumption is sufficient for our cryptographic protocol. Bob's squeezed light is much brighter and has on the average one photon per pulse.

Our quantum cryptographic key distribution protocol is described as follows:

- 1: Assuming that  $\alpha_i$  is randomly selected from four quantum states  $a = \{a_E, a_W, a_N, a_S\}$ , Alice constructs a vector  $A = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n)$  of  $n$  random choices,  $\alpha_i \in a = \{a_E, a_W, a_N, a_S\}$ .  $a$  is public information, while  $A$  is private data only known by Alice.

**Table 1** The results of the photon coupling. The illustration is based on a quadrature plane. We have assumed equal intensity for both mode  $a$  and mode  $b$ , the symbol “ $\times$ ” represents “discarded”, C represents “Cancelled”, E represents “Enhanced”, and a sign, character or binary figure in front of “/” has a higher probability of appearance. In other words, those in front of “/” are correct; those behind “/” are associated with the overlap on the corresponding opposite state. The later ones can be corrected eventually.

Alice	Bob	Coupling Result	Measurement			Final Result
			Vector	Status	Result	
$a_E$	$b_E$	$a' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_1 + b_1]$	$V_x$	E/C	0/1	0
		$b' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(-/+)a_1 + b_1]$	$V_x$	C/E		
	$b_N$	$a' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_1 + ib_2]$	$V_y$	Uncertain	$\times$	
		$b' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(-/+)a_1 + ib_2]$	$V_y$	Uncertain		
$a_W$	$b_E$	$a' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(-/+)a_1 + b_1]$	$V_x$	C/E	1/0	1
		$b' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_1 + b_1]$	$V_x$	E/C		
	$b_N$	$a' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(-/+)a_1 + ib_2]$	$V_y$	Uncertain	$\times$	
		$b' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_1 + ib_2]$	$V_y$	Uncertain		
$a_N$	$b_E$	$a' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[b_1 + (+/-)ia_2]$	$V_x$	Uncertain	$\times$	
		$b' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[b_1 - (+/-)ia_2]$	$V_x$	Uncertain		
	$b_N$	$a' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_2 + b_2]$	$V_y$	E/C	0/1	0
		$b' = -\frac{i}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_2 - b_2]$	$V_y$	C/E		
$a_S$	$b_E$	$a' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[b_1 - (+/-)ia_2]$	$V_x$	Uncertain	$\times$	
		$b' = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}[b_1 + (+/-)ia_2]$	$V_x$	Uncertain		
	$b_N$	$a' = -\frac{i}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_2 - b_2]$	$V_y$	C/E	1/0	1
		$b' = \frac{i}{\sqrt{2}}[(+/-)a_2 + b_2]$	$V_y$	E/C		

- 2: Bob independently chooses a vector  $B = (\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_n)$  of  $n$  random choices,  $\beta_i \in b = \{b_E, b_N\}$ .  $b$  is public information, but  $B$  is private data only known by Bob.
- 3: Alice sends a  $\alpha_i \in A$  to Bob, while Bob injects a  $\beta_i$  which interacts with  $\alpha_i$  in Bob’s optical coupler. The coupling result is shown in Table 1. In terms of the subsequent detection,

$$\text{Bob sets } \beta'_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{(a bright flash at Port 1 and nothing at Port 2),} \\ 1 & \text{(a bright flash at Port 2 and nothing at Port 1),} \end{cases}$$

otherwise, Bob deletes the bit. Alice and Bob repeat the process until the whole signal string is sent. “bright flash” means that two photons have been projected on Bob’s detection vector. Bob’s method can be summarized as **screening criterion**: *An output bit from the optical coupler is recorded, if and only if Bob finds that two photons are projected on the detector at one port and nothing is projected on the detector at the other port.* This criterion solves the problem caused by noise. Bob’s measurements are based on a homodyne detection scheme, where both detectors are arranged in terms of the tap-fibre mode used by Bob himself. If the tap-fibre mode is based on  $b_E$ , both detectors should also be set toward the  $x$  direction; if the tap-fibre mode is based on  $b_N$ , both detectors should be set up toward the  $y$  direction. Bob keeps  $B$  and  $B' = (\beta'_1, \beta'_2, \dots, \beta'_n)$  secret.

- 4: Bob speaks to Alice publicly for each  $\beta'_i$ : *Accept* if Bob “saw” a bright flash at Port 1 (2) and

nothing at Port 2 (1) (obeying the screening criterion); *reject* if Bob “saw” flashes at both ports or other instances which do not satisfy the screening criterion.

- 5: Since Bob’s result contains a large number of flaw bits owing to quantum noise and overlapping, Bob must announce to Alice which detection vector has been used for each accepted bit, but nothing about the outcome of the measurement. Alice asks Bob to delete all bits obtained using an incorrect detection vector, for example, Alice may ask him to delete a north-state-related “0” bit which is obtained by using  $V_x$ . This step ensures that all flaw bits subject to the overlaps with two closer neighbour states (but not the opposite state) are removed. (We will give more explanation later.)
- 6: Bob’s remaining bits still contain a number of flaw bits subject to overlap with the opposite states. In order to correct (but not remove) the flaw bits, the following steps should be taken:
  - Alice secretly divides all remaining bits related to each state, east, north, west, or south into  $N$  groups ( $N \geq 100$ ), where each group contains  $m$  bits (in the present case,  $m \geq 30$  is appropriate). This requires that the number of original signal bits sent by Alice are sufficient. Each group involves only one signal state, but both binary bits. Amongst these binary bits, one fraction of binary bits (“0” or “1”) stems from the correct detections and these bits are the majority; the other fraction of binary bits (“1” or “0”) comes from the overlap on the opposite state. Note that during the grouping the original positions of the bits were not changed.
  - Alice publicly announces the grouping result, without releasing any encoding information. So nobody knows which group belongs to which state, except Alice herself. Since each Bob’s detection vector has been used to two nonorthogonal states, knowing the detection vector of each group releases no encoding information of the group.
  - Bob calculates the number of “0” or “1” bits in each group. The encoding of the majority bits will represent the encoding of *all bits* in the group. For example, if Bob finds that “0” bits are the majority, he will regard all bits in the group as “0”. So far Bob has corrected all mistakes caused by the overlap with the corresponding opposite state and has obtained the encoding information of each group. This step can only be implemented by Bob, because he is the only one who knows the measurement result.
  - Bob tells Alice the positions of all useful bits. Alice knows the full information of these bits.

7: Alice and Bob keep the bits which have eventually survived as the secret key.

Table 1 shows all possible detection results obtained by Bob when both light pulses have the same intensity. Instead of illustrating all cases in the table, we only focus on the first case, where Alice uses the east state  $a_E$ . The explanations for the remaining cases are similar. In the first case, Bob uses  $b_E$  (consistently use  $V_x$ ). According to the coupling equations, there are two possible outcomes: (1) The output at port 1 is enhanced and the output at port 2 is reduced to a vacuum state due to the cancellation. Bob then further checks whether the outputs satisfy the screening criterion. If the answer is yes, a “0” is accordingly recorded. (2) Because of the superposition between the east state and the opposite west state, a large fraction of bits associated with the east state turn out being mixed with the west state, and Bob could then have a false result and a “1” is hence recorded. The later bit is obviously wrong, but Bob does not realize his mistake. In order to overcome this problem, Alice divides all accepted bits related to the east state into  $N$  (say 100) groups and each group contains  $m$  (say 30) bits (please see later analysis). By calculating the number of “0” or “1” bits, Bob is able to find the majority bits which will be used to represent the encoding of all bits in the group. The mechanism of this error correcting method is simple: since the overlap between the states is not 100%, there is a larger probability of obtaining the east state rather than the west state. This is obviously

true, because only if the superposition is 100%, the probability of obtaining the east state or the west state is  $1/2$ ,

By means of a Q-representation, we can further explain the error correcting method. A coherent state  $\alpha$  in a Q-representation is given by

$$Q(\gamma) = \frac{1}{\pi} e^{-|\gamma-\alpha|^2}, \quad (11)$$

which actually represents a quasi-probability of the coherent state. For the east coherent state with an average projection value of 0.33 (an intensity of 0.1 photon) on the  $x$  axis (on the quadrature-phase plane), the probability of a projection being around 1 on a small region  $(\Delta x) \cdot y$ , where  $-\infty < y < \infty$ , is given by

$$P(\text{projection} = 1 | \alpha = 0.33) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} e^{-0.67^2 \Delta x} \approx 0.36 \Delta x, \quad (12)$$

while the probability of projection being  $-1$  on the small region is given by

$$P(\text{projection} = -1 | \alpha = 0.33) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} e^{-1.33^2 \Delta x} \approx 0.0963 \Delta x. \quad (13)$$

It is easy to find that, amongst the total pulses with a value 1 or  $-1$  projection on  $x$  axis, the 1-pulses is 79% and the  $-1$ -pulses 21%. According to these data, we may roughly calculate the correctness rate of Bob's error correcting: assuming that  $m = 30$  and the minimal number of bits  $m_{min}$  for Bob to correctly identify the encoding is greater than  $m/2 = 15$ , we have the correctness rate:

$$P(m_{min} > m/2) = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^m \binom{m}{i} (0.79)^i (0.21)^{m-i} \approx 0.9996. \quad (14)$$

This value suggests that Bob is almost 100% correct. Note however that if an eavesdropper wants to measure the signal, she cannot have such a high ratio of 1-pulses to  $-1$ -pulses, since her detection is subject to the superposition from other two neighbour states, the north and south states. More serious problem for the eavesdropper is that she does not know which detection vector should be used. Bob does not have this problem, because Alice can ask him to delete all bits owing to the superposition with the two neighbour states and due to using incorrect detection vectors. This case will be further studied in next section.

We now focus on the second case, i.e., Alice still uses  $a = a_1$  and Bob uses the other mode  $b_N$  (consistently uses  $V_y$ ). Bob is obviously wrong. Most possibly, the outputs at one or both ports are nonzero, Bob can thus "view" a light flash with a various intensity at one or both ports. These bits are useless and can be removed in terms of the screening criterion. However, since the measurement is subject to the noise or overlaps, we must consider that Bob might occasionally obtain a result which meets the screening criterion. When this happens, Bob will not be able to identify the flaw. In order to get rid of these flaw bits, no matter what measurement result has been obtained, Alice will ask Bob to remove the bit.

We have not explained the influence of overlaps associated with the two neighbour states, the north and south states. These instances actually belong to other two cases where Alice sends the north or south state. The corresponding flaw bits will be handled by Alice and Bob using a similar procedure to that given above.

## 4 Eavesdropping

Assume that there is an adversary called Eve who attempts to eavesdrop on Alice and Bob's communication. Eve could launch an intercept/resend attack. The first method Eve could choose is to measure the intercepted signal by using a similar optical coupler. If she does so, at least half of her

measurements will be random, because she has to randomly select her tap-fibre states and detection vectors. Moreover, the remaining half of Bob's measurements are also uncertain due to the superposition with respect to Alice's signal. Therefore, it is impossible for Eve to regenerate and resend the signal to Bob, using her own measurement.

Assume that Eve knows that four projection operators,  $\{V_{-x}, V_x, V_{-y}, \text{ and } V_y\}$ , can be used to detect Alice's signal and these detection vectors respectively suit detecting  $a_E, a_W, a_N,$  and  $a_S$ . Eve might then wish to use her detector to measure Alice's signal directly, instead of using an optical coupler. However since she does not know which state has been sent by Alice, she has no better way than to choose a detection vector randomly. The probability of choosing the correct detection vector is obviously  $1/4$ . Fortunately, even if she happens to select the correct detector, her measurement is still uncertain because of the overlap of the encoding states. If Eve has a correct detection vector and knows that a projection of value 1 is important, it is not hard to find there is a probability of  $3/5$  for her obtaining a wrong projection belonging to the neighbour states. These bits cannot be identified by Eve. The total success rate of measuring a bit is found to be  $1/10$ . In fact it is impossible for Eve to know whether or not she has used the correct detection vector, since, from Bob's public information, she can only know either  $V_x$  or  $V_y$  has been used by Bob ( $V_x$  or  $V_y$  corresponds to two Alice's states). This suggests that even if Eve's success rate is  $1/10$ , she cannot know which detection is successful. Consequently, Eve achieves nothing from such eavesdropping.

Eve may not do anything but just listens to Alice and Bob's public conversation. After Alice and Bob implement the protocol, Eve is aware which detection vector has been used, which bits were accepted, and which detection vector has been applied to each group chosen by Alice. Because each Bob's detection vector corresponds to two nonorthogonal states, Eve can only guess whether the bits in each group belong to either "0" or "1". Hence, for each individual group, Eve has a  $1/2$  chance to succeed. However, since the number of groups for each state  $N > 100$ , Eve's success rate will be less than  $1/2^{400}$  or approximately  $1/10^{120}$ . In practice, it is highly unlikely for Eve to succeed.

The requirement for the number of bits in each group depends on the superposition of encoding states. As discussed in the previous section, if the average number of photons is 0.1,  $m = 30$  is appropriate for Bob to obtain a good success rate. However, if Eve has a little knowledge about the encodings, she could also implement a similar statistical analysis. How can Eve obtain a small piece of information on a group? Eve knows that it will not work, if she intercepts all signal pulses. In order to avoid being detected, Eve may randomly intercept/measure only a small fraction of signal pulses using the four detection vectors, for instance 10% in the total number of pulses, and lets the rest go through without being interfered. Can Eve then have good guesses? In the case  $m = 30$ , Eve intercepts only 3 pulses (among 30). The measurement on the 3 pulses (based on randomly choosing measuring vector) is not adequate for her to implement a statistical analysis. Moreover, intercepting 10% of total pulses could also result in a substantial influence on Bob's measurement which could reveal Eve's attempt.

However, if the size of  $m$  is large, say 1000, with intercepting a small number of bits Eve may then have enough bits used for her statistical analysis. Again, the big problem for her is how to obtain useful encoding information on these bits. The most thinkable way could still be the interception, but according to the discussion in the second paragraph of present section, Eve cannot obtain any useful information even for a single bit. Consequently, even if  $m$  is large, Eve is still unable to carry out a statistical analysis. However, there might be some other unseen way such that Eve could obtain a small fraction of information from Alice's signal. A large  $m$  will then in principle be useful for Eve. Therefore we should define an upper limit for  $m$ . Because the upper limit depends on the superposition of the signal, we can only define a general criterion: the limit on  $m$  should be the minimum value where Bob has a satisfied success rate.

Our protocol seems secure against eavesdropping discussed above, whereas we have not discussed more general measurements Eve could in principle make, such as a general measurement on the infinite dimensional Hilbert space of light pulse. More analysis would be done in a subsequent paper.



## 5 Signal to noise ratio

We now turn our attention to the signal to noise ratio. We study the coupling quadrature amplitude  $a'_1$ . The other cases are similar. By averaging over the signal we find that the ratio of the intensity signal to noise for homodyne detection in coupling mode  $a'_1$  is

$$SNR = \langle a'_1 \rangle^2 / \langle \Delta a'^2_1 \rangle = \frac{[(1 - \kappa)^{1/2} \langle a_1 \rangle + \kappa^{1/2} \langle b_1 \rangle]^2}{(1 - \kappa) \langle \Delta a^2_1 \rangle + \kappa \langle \Delta b^2_1 \rangle} \quad (15)$$

where only bright output pulses are considered (according to the screening criterion, only output at one port is bright).

Because the tap-fibre mode is controlled by Bob, Bob can use a specific photon source. In particular, Bob can use squeezed light. An ideal squeezed state is a kind of minimum uncertainty state. One quadrature component (say  $a_1$ ) of the field has smaller fluctuations than the other quadrature component (say  $a_2$ ), in terms of the uncertainty principle. Explicitly,  $\langle \Delta a^2_1 \rangle < 1/4$  and  $\langle \Delta a^2_2 \rangle > 1/4$ . Using the quadrature component with smaller noise can greatly improve the signal to noise ratio of the system.

We focus on the signal to noise ratio in which mode  $b$  is a squeezed state and mode  $a$  is a coherent state. The noise observed in detection comes from both the signal mode sent by Alice ( $a$ ) and the auxiliary tap-fibre mode ( $b$ ). If the intensity for both modes is equal, we obtain the ratio:

$$\frac{SNR_{sq}}{SNR_{coh}} = [1 - \kappa + \kappa \frac{\langle \Delta b^2_1 \rangle}{\langle \Delta a^2_1 \rangle}]^{-1} = 2, \quad (16)$$

where  $SNR_{sq}$  denotes the signal to noise ratio when the mode  $b$  is a perfect squeezed state;  $SNR_{coh}$  is the signal to noise ratio both Alice and Bob use coherent light. We have assumed  $\kappa = 1/2$ . It is found that a doubling of the signal to noise ratio has been obtained.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a quantum cryptographic system based on the optical coupler and four nonorthogonal states modelled by using quantized arguments: quadrature phase amplitudes of light field. It will be the first demonstration of the usefulness of quadrature phase amplitudes and the optical coupler to quantum cryptography. We have also showed that the communication efficiency can be improved by using squeezed light to the tap fibre.

Photon attenuation has not been studied in this paper, however, the protocol proposed in this work also fits the situation when leakage of photons occurs. The reason is simply that Bob can discard all bits which do not satisfy the screening criterion and keep those which satisfy the screening criterion. If the leakage is considerable large, Alice may make her signal a bit stronger, say 0.15 photon on the average. The slightly stronger signal will not make the security worse.

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