

Updates on Signcryption

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Signcryption

- Provides the functions of
 - digital signature
 - unforgeability & non-repudiation
 - public key encryption
 - confidentiality
- Has a significantly smaller comp. & comm. cost

$$\text{Cost (signcryption)} \ll \text{Cost (signature)} + \text{Cost (encryption)}$$

Signcryption -- public & secret parameters

- Public to all
 - p : a large prime
 - q : a large prime factor of $p-1$
 - g : $0 < g < p$ & with order $q \bmod p$
 - G : 1-way hash
 - H : 1-way hash
 - (E, D) : private-key encryption & decryption algorithms

Alice's keys :

x_a : secret key
 y_a : public key
 $(y_a = g^{x_a} \bmod p)$

Bob's keys :

x_b : secret key
 y_b : public key
 $(y_b = g^{x_b} \bmod p)$

Signcryption -- 1st example

$m \longrightarrow (c, r, s)$

$(c, r, s) \longrightarrow m$

Signcryption by Alice :

1. Pick at random $x \in_R \{1, \dots, q-1\}$
2. $w = y_b^x \bmod p$
3. $k = G(w)$
4. $r = H(m, \text{bind_info}, w)$
5. $s = x / (r + x_a) \bmod q$
6. $c = E_k(m)$
7. return (c, r, s)

Unsigncryption by Bob :

1. $w = (y_a \cdot g^r)^{s \cdot x_b} \bmod p$
2. $k = G(w)$
3. $m = D_k(c)$
4. Return m if
 $r = H(m, \text{bind_info}, w)$
5. Return "invalid" otherwise

Signcryption – 2nd example

$$m \longrightarrow (c, r, s)$$

$$(c, r, s) \longrightarrow m$$

Signcryption by Alice :

1. Pick at random $x \in_R \{1, \dots, q-1\}$
2. $w = y_b^x \bmod p$
3. $k = G(w)$
4. $r = H(m, \text{bind_info}, w)$
5. $s = x / (1 + x_a \cdot r) \bmod q$
6. $c = E_k(m)$
7. return (c, r, s)

Unsigncryption by Bob :

1. $w = (g \cdot y_a^r)^{s \cdot x_b} \bmod p$
2. $k = G(w)$
3. $m = D_k(c)$
4. Return m if
 $r = H(m, \text{bind_info}, w)$
5. Return "invalid" otherwise

Signcryption – 3rd example

$$m \longrightarrow (c, r, s)$$

$$(c, r, s) \longrightarrow m$$

Signcryption by Alice :

1. Pick at random $x \in_R \{1, \dots, q-1\}$
2. $w = y_b^x \bmod p$
3. $k = G(w)$
4. $r = H(m, \text{bind_info}, w)$
5. $s = (x - x_a \cdot r) \bmod q$
6. $c = E_k(m)$
7. return (c, r, s)

Unsigncryption by Bob :


1. $w = (g^s \cdot y_a^r)^{x_b} \bmod p$
2. $k = G(w)$
3. $m = D_k(c)$
4. Return m if
 $r = H(m, \text{bind_info}, w)$
5. Return "invalid" otherwise

Major instantiations of signcryption

- based on DL on an **Elliptic Curve**
 - Zheng, CRYPTO'97
 - Zheng & Imai IPL 1998
- based on other **sub-groups** (e.g. **XTR**)
 - Lenstra & Verheul, CRYPTO2000
 - Gong & Harn, IEEE-IT 2000
 - Zheng, CRYPTO'97
- based on DL on **finite field**
 - Zheng, CRYPTO'97
- based on **factoring** / residuosity
 - Steinfeld & Zheng, ISW2000
 - Zheng, PKC2001




Signcryption v.s. Signature-then-Encryption




DL Signcryption v.s. sign-then-encrypt

of multiplications



DL Signcryption v.s. sign-then-encrypt

comm. overhead
(# of bits)



Security Proofs

- Analysis given in the Crypto'97 paper was informal
- In 2001,
 - Rigorous proofs (reductions) established
 - Results presented at PKC02 in Paris, Feb. 2002
 - Proof techniques applicable to signcryption schemes based on DL and EC

Standard assumptions

- Proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeability of signcryption
 - Confidentiality --- Providing a reduction
 - from breaking the security of signcryption with respect to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the flexible public key model
 - to breaking the [GAP Diffie-Hellman assumption](#), in the random oracle model
 - Unforgeability --- Providing a reduction
 - from breaking the unforgeability of signcryption against adaptive chosen message attacks
 - to the [Discrete Logarithm problem](#), in the random oracle model

Updated documents

- Full version of the proof paper and updated descriptions of concrete signcryption schemes will be submitted to the IEEE P1363 website

Other developments

- Security proofs for combined signature and encryption including signcryption
- Parallel signcryption
- ID-based signcryption
- Threshold signcryption

Suggestions

- IEEE P1363 consider to standardize signcryption and other hybrid/combined schemes
- IEEE P1363-3 ?